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All Con & CADRE
This is an interview held with COL (RET) DANNY MCKNIGHT who was the 3rd Ranger Battalion Commander in Mogadishu during the Battle of the Black Sea. or also known as Black Hawk Down. He was in control of the convoy that snatched the EPWs and transported them back to base. His answers are brief due to his busy schedule I talked further with him on the phone. If anyone is interested I'd be glad to elaborate on what he talked to me about.
Hope you all can use this to improve on yourselves! Please do not cite any of these answers. He answered me knowing I was doing a research project about Mogadishu but may not want himself being cited outside of this paper, thank you.
-2LT Charlie Fralick
CF 1 In your opinion what contributed to the increasing violent tensions between Somalis and US soldiers? was it the history with the Marine Corps being deployed there, the UN and Jonathan Howe's policy on Mogadishu, Cultural / language barriers or something else?
DM 1 The increased violence was simply a normal response for the Somalis towards anyone (US forces or UN forces) trying to remove Mohammed Farah Aidid. I do think it was more violent due to the influence of a terrorist element from Sudan in 1993 ... yes, we were fighting terrorism in the Mogadishu streets. I would further say it was a cultural issue as well.
CF 2 Do you think the previous 5 air assault missions helped Aidid's militia prepare for your attack on his second hand men? For example, some of Aidid's men were quoted saying that the even though mission times were changed and fake missions were flown that the tactics were still the same.
DM 2 We had actually conducted 6 missions prior to Oct 3-4, and they were all somewhat different. We did not did not use the helicopters on 2 of those 6 -- vehicles only. The tactics and template for execution should be similar but not exactly the same each time ... the only thing that happened to cause us a problem that Oct day was 2 helicopters being shot down.
CF 3 In the book 'Me Against My Brother' written by a journalist Scott Peterson, he contributes the violence to the US's change in policy and step up in military force. Do you feel this assessment is correct?
DM 3 -- The violence was not due to any US policy, but more related to my answer stated in #1 above.
CF 4 Do you think the administrative change from George Bush Sr. to Bill Clinton played a role in how we acted in Mogadishu? and If so how much did White House politics get in the way of you accomplishing your mission?
4a How much did our policy change from Operation Restore Hope in 1992- to early 1993 up until your deployment in late 1993?
DM 4 -- The change from President Bush to President Clinton was definitely significant in my opinion. The Clinton Administration was not prepared to face a fight as was shown by withdrawing us without capturing Aidid. The White House politics were a major factor regarding mission accomplishment -- a Negative factor.
The policy changed dramatically as things went from providing relief to combat.
CF 5 I remember in your speech at Ft. Knox you contributed the mission's troubles to the fact that your force was cut in half before you set foot in Somalia, How much did this affect your time in Mogadishu.
DM 5 -- The changes in our force structure for the mission was a major factor in what occurred in Somalia for us. The Task Force was reduced by about 100 personnel and the AC-130 Gunship was not allowed to be a part of our plan ... this all happened 24-36 hours prior to our deployment o/a August 26, 93. We additional personnel would have given us more fighters on Oct 3-4 for instance, and the AC-130 could have provided some significant firepower to assist in recovering the personnel at the 2nd downed helicopter position.
CF 6 What exactly was your mission while deployed in Mogadishu? Several books report that it was to disarm the Bukhara market? Others say it was in retaliation of Somali violence, and still more theorize that it was to apprehend General Aidid and convict him as a war criminal.
DM 6 -- The mission in Somalia for Task Force RANGER was plain and simple -- capture Aidid and any of his key personnel.
CF 7 -- The Somalis fighting us were 90% made up of those loyal to Aidid only ... he took care of them with food and weapons. There were lots of good people in Somalia who wanted to have a peaceful life.
DM 7 There is a Somali proverb that states: "Me and my clan against the world; me and my family against my clan; me and my brother against my family; me against my brother." Do you think that even though Somalis were fighting a civil war that they banded together to fight US Forces?
CF 8 What do you think is the contributing factor to US forces being kept in a moving firefight for 15 hours as opposed to the expected mission time of 1 hour?
DM8 -- The 18-hour fight on Oct 3-4 was the result of 2 helicopters being shot down ... had to get to them and take care of our people. If the helicopters had not been down, we would have accomplished the mission in a very timely manner and with minimum casualties.
CF 9 Did the movie Black Hawk Down portray you and your soldiers in a correct picture?
DM #9 -- I think the movie is about 70-75% accurate in its portrayal of the battle and the actions of the soldiers. The most important thing portrayed was how the special operations soldiers will fight to accomplish the mission and take care of each other no matter how tough it gets.
CF 10 Do you feel that the movie pushed racism and if so where there any racist sentiments between your men and the local population?
DM 10 -- Racism was not an issue with us, and the movie does not really make a big deal of it in my opinion.
CF 11 Finaly what rank where you during th mission? Hollywood portrays you as a LTC. Is this correct? Or were you a Captain or Major at the time?
DM 11 -- I was a LTC in Somalia -- was the Commander of 3rd Ranger Battalion at the time. I was promoted to COL in Sep 1995 and retired as a COL on Jan 1, 2002.
Other Questions:
CF 3 How was it working with Delta and SEAL team 6? Did the different units contribute to any confusion?
DM 3 -- It was always awesome working with Delta and the SEAL team. There was no confusion because we trained together as a matter of routine.
CF 4 Was it difficult to keep a positive spin on things, discipline and motivation high after October 3?
DM #4 -- Our Oct 3-4, our focus was still to go capture Aidid if given a chance to do so, which unfortunately did not occur. Discipline was never a concern or a problem with any member of Task Force RANGER ... the motivation was always there to go accomplish the mission -- that never changed.
5 As far as leadership goes what do you feel is the most important aspect of a leader while in battle or back in garrison after casualties had been suffered?
#5 -- Being with your soldiers and always maintaining a positive attitude and approach about the next mission and being ready to go get it done. Casualties happen, so we must be ready for that and put it in its place then move-in to the next thing to accomplish.
Now for the last 2 questions you sent me:
#1 -- The toughest moment for me was when we returned to the airfield the first time with the prisoners. It was then so tough because I could see all my dead and wounded ... it was somewhat overwhelming at first to say the least. I will never forget that feeling within me.
#2 -- Our most intense fight with the enemy was when we were making the movement to the first crash site after collecting all the prisoners at the target building ... the enemy was everywhere and shooting at us from every building, especially from the doors and windows. The number of RPGs that were fired at us was quite incredible to say the least.
Well, I think that takes care of all the answers to your questions ... hope they make sense. I will look forward to hearing from you, and us discussing the questions/answers. Take care.
-Danny McKnight
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